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H OUSE BILL NO. 254, effective August 26, 1982, involves a balancing of
competing interests as well as an attempt to bring Ohio law into com-
pliance with the procedural requirements mandated, on Constitutional grounds,
by various U.S. Supreme Court cases. It involves a cost-benefit analysis because,
in making decisions in this area, one must balance the costs associated with
procedural requirements against the benefits afforded to consumers. The costs
involved are costs to consumers, as there is little doubt that any costs associated
with the procedural requirements in effect since August 26, 1982, will be borne
by consumers. To be sure, financial institutions are subject to financial and
regulatory constraints. However, given any reasonable assumptions about
elasticity of demand, the financial institutions have the economic power to pass
increased costs on. Of course, we are talking about primary demand, not selec-
tive demand; selective demand is not an issue since all financial institutions
will be subject to procedural requirement of H.B. 254. As for regulation, this
author is not aware of any regulations that would prevent financial institu-
tions from passing the procedural cost on to consumers.
The cost-benefit analysis requires quantification. There is little question
that the cost associated with the new procedures can be quantified. It is more
difficult to quantify the cost associated with the failure to afford certain pro-
cedural protections. To the extent that these protections are mandated by the
Constitution, no cost-benefit analysis need be made by the Ohio Legislature.
However, it is likely that, at least in some respects, H.B. 254 enacts procedures
that are not, at least as yet, required by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. In evaluating these procedural protections (those not man-
dated by the United States Supreme Court) one must examine the benefit to
the consumer or to put it another way, the cost to the consumer of a failiure
to enact these procedural safeguards. This is extremely difficult because not
all of the protection afforded a consumer are capable of quanitification. If
one's resources are attached by legal process and one is deprived on them, even
temporarily, one may be severely injured. For example, the money of which
a consumer is temporarily deprived may be money needed to pay for food or
heat or other life-sustaining benefits. The marginal utility of money must be
considered which is difficult to quantify.
*A.B. Fordham University, 1956; J.D., Columbia University, 1961; Professor of Law, The University
of Akron School of Law, Akron, Ohio.
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In making the cost-benefit analysis, one cannot be unmindful that only
a miniscule percentage of consumers take advantage of the procedural safeguards
afforded in those instances where safeguards are required. There is no way
to tell whether consumers will begin to take advantage of such safeguards but
at least if history is a guide, it seems that some consumers themselves have
spoken eloquently of the lack of benefit associated with the procedural pro-
tections enacted in such statutes as H.B. 254. It may be that the benefits afforded
to those who assert their procedural rights justify the costs associated with the
procedural safeguards. Clearly, empirical data will have to be gathered and
evaluated, and it may well be that the legislature's assessment of the cost-benefit
equation will shift as new data is provided.
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1.00 The Legislative History and Case Law Background of H.B. 254
Amended Substitute House Bill No. 254, hereinafter referred to as H.B.
254, became law on August 26, 1982, "culminat[ing] three years of concen-
trated work on the subject matter"' by the Banking and Commercial Law Com-
mittee of the Ohio State Bar Association, as well as the Ohio General Assembly.
H.B. 254 is an effort to bring to this area of the law a "certainty of creditor-
debtor rights and remedies ' 2 that has not existed in Ohio for nearly thirteen
years.3 While H.B. 254 is mostly a codification of substantive changes in the
creditor's rights area, 4 it also contains provisions that integrate what would
otherwise be overlapping sections of the Ohio Revised Code.5
1.01 Legislative History Specifics
According to one of the drafters of H.B. 254,6 the bill had its origin in
two bills proposed before the 114th Ohio General Assembly. The original House
Bill No. 254 (as opposed to Amended Substitute House Bill No. 254) approved
by the House was confined to revisions of Ohio's garnishment procedure. Senate
Bill No. 244 was limited to amendments to two of Ohio's provisional remedies:
prejudgment attachment and replevin. A conference between the House and
'55 Ohio Bar 1103 (July 1982).
'Newton, Procedural Due Process and Pre-Judgment Creditor Remedies: A Proposal for Reform of the
Balancing Test, 34 WASH.& LEEL. REV. 65 (1977) (citing Anderson and Guidry, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co.: Recognition of Creditor's Rights, 80 COM. L.J. 63 (1975)).
'This period of uncertainty began with Sinadach v. Family Finance Corp. 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see infra,
§ 1.01-1.02.
'There are five major creditor's remedies, both provisional and post-judgment, that are codified in H.B. 254:
1) Pre-judgment attachment - 2715.01 et seq (except for 2715.091-2715.13).
2) Pre-judgment garnishment of property other than wages - 2715.091-2715.13.
3) Post-judgment garnishment of wages - 2716.01 et seq (except for 2716.11-2716.13).
4) Post-judgment garnishment of property other than wages - 2716.11-2716.13.
5) Pre-judgment replevin - 2713.01 et seq.
'OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1911.26, 1911.27, 1911.28, 1911.56, and 1911.58 effectively integrate county
court procedure with that followed in common pleas courts, thereby doing away with the system of dual
procedure that previously existed. Similarly, new § 2715.51 incorporates by reference the procedures spelled
out in § 2715.01-2715.49.
6Dennis Papp, of the Ohio Legislative Services Commission, in a conversation on November 15, 1982
related this legislative scenario. William K. Weisenberg, Director of Government Affairs for the Ohio
State Bar Association, confirmed this in a conversation on November 19, 1982.
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Senate legislators who had prepared the respective bills7 resulted in the syn-
thesis piece of legislation that is now law in Ohio, H.B. 254.
1.02 The Case Law Background: Federal Level
1.02(A) The Sniadach Line of Cases
On four occasions since 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States
has decided cases involving 'due process' questions associated with provisional
creditor's remedies. Those landmark cases were Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,8 Fuentes v. Shevin,9 Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., and North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc." The cases involved, respectively, Wiscon-
sin's wage garnishment statute, Florida's pre-judgment replevin statute, the
rights of a possessor of a vendor's lien under Louisiana law, and Georgia's
garnishment statute as it related to bank accounts. In all but the Mitchell case,
procedural defects found in the various state statutes, resulted in the procedures
delineated in those statutes being declared unconstitutional.I 2 The problems
experienced by the courts in applying the shifting procedural due process
standard of the Supreme Court has been noted in both case law and legal
journals.' 3 It would not be unreasonable to assume that the Ohio General
Assembly has given the citizens of this state a law that goes well beyond the
explicit due process requirements of the Sniadach line of cases' in order to
insure that the law will remain within whatever minimum standards the United
States Supreme Court may promulgate in the future. 5
'Senators Michael Schwarzwalder, Michael DeWine, Paul Pfeifer, Richard Finan, and Representative
Thomas Pottenger.
'395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'407 U.S. 67 (1972).
'-416 U.S. 600 (1974).
'419 U.S. 601 (1975).
'For excellent analysis of the Sniadach line of Supreme Court cases and the doctrines that they espouse,
see Catz and Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell,
North Carolina and Beyond, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541 (1975); Scott Constitutional Regulation of
Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REV. 807 (1975); Note,
Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975); Chief Justice Celebrezze's majority opinion in Peebles v. Clement, 63 Ohio
St. 2d 314, 317, 408 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1980).
'"See, e.g., Farmers Savings & Trust Co. v. Ridenour, 12 0.0. 3d 370, 371 n.1, (Crawford Cty. Muni.
Ct. 1979); Comment, Replevin in Ohio: It's Nature, Development and Constitutionality, 7 U. TOL. L.
REV. 517, 547-87 (1977); Tabac, Repossession of Goods in Ohio: Remedies in Search of a Rule, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 241 (1975), on whether or not Ohio's replevin statute was definitely unconstitutional. For
an analysis of the problem in another jurisdiction, see McLaughlin, Essay-Prejudgment Attachments and
the Concept of the Neutral Magaistrate: A Tale of Two Cases, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 203 (1980).
"Whether or not the new law exceeds the minimum requirements set forth in Sniadach and its progeny
is certainly open for debate. The place to begin such a discussion is with the majority opinion in Peebles
v. Clement, and its analysis of Sniadach since that analysis of what the Supreme Court requires in the
way of due process for debtors has been adopted, practically verbatim, by the Ohio General Assembly
in H.B. 254. See infra, at § 1.03. It can be said that the new law does, in fact, greatly exceed the Supreme
Court's expectations. Lawrence Walsh, Clerk of Court for Akron Municipal Court expressed such sentiments
in a conversation on November 3, 1982. Yet, it can also be said that the new law doesn't go far enough
(see infra, § 1.03, § 1.04, and note 15.
"There is the suggestion in Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278 (1970), that
[Vol. 16:3AKRON LAW REVIEW
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It has been suggested 6 that the case of Mathews v. Eldridge" provides
guidance into the procedural benchmarks with which the court is most con-
cerned. Specifically, the competing interests of the creditor and debtor are to
be subjectively weighed by the court through the balancing of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; Second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.' 8
The weighing of these factors in Fuentes, for example, produced the result
that "even a temporary taking of property was a deprivation under the Due
Process Clause, and that a defendant debtor ... was entitled to 'due process'
protection."'I9 The Fuentes Court found that the private interest of the debtor
in maintaining possession and the possible erroneous deprivation of that interest
by the granting of a writ of replevin clearly outweighed the private interest
of the creditor in receiving either money or goods for the debt owed.
The Court reached a different result in Mitchell after weighing the same
factors as applied to the specific facts of the case. The interest of a person
that could prove that they were a lienholder under Louisiana law was taken
to be greater than the interest of a person who possessed the property in which
the lienholder claimed a security interest. As suggested elsewhere, this result
may have been reached because "the rights of the lienholder were dissolved
if the debtor transferred the property" 20 to a third party.
1.02(B) Exemptions of Certain Federal Benefits and Other
"Special Property"'"
The last several decades have seen the rise of a large number of benefits
and programs sponsored by the Federal government that have been deemed
by both judges and laypeople as deserving of special protection and recogni-
tion by the law.2" Social Security benefits 3 and ERISA-protected pension plan
the logical extension of procedural due process by the Court will eventually lead to a requirement that
all possible avenues of appeal and attempts to do justice be exhausted before a taking of property may
take place. See also, the possible constitutional attacks on Kentucky's provisional creditor's remedies statutes
suggested in Mapother, The Constitutionality of Kentucky's Prejudgment Seizure Law, 68 Ky. L.J. 557,
559 (1980). Kentucky's codification of these remedies is fairly similar to that contained in H.B. 254. See
the 1978 amendments to KY. REV. STAT. 425; see, e.g., 425.301.
"Comment, Post-judgment Garnishment Procedures in Connecticut: A Due Process Analysis and Practical
Guide 14 CoNN. L. REV. 883, 890 (1982).
"424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"Id. at 334-35.
"Peebles v. Clement, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 318, 408 N.E. 2d at 692.
1d. at 319, 408 N.E. 2d at 692.
"This concept was first introduced in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
"See the majority opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d. Cir. 1980); See Note, Due Process Requires Notice of Exemptions
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pay-outs2" have received explicit judicial protection from the claims of creditors
in recent years. In Ohio, the standards promulgated by the Consumer Credit
Protection Act25 effectively preempted portions of Ohio's garnishment laws
in the early 1970's.26 In each of these cases, there existed a conflict between
the protection afforded by law to certain kinds of "special property" belonging
to debtors and the desire of creditors to gain possession of that "special
property."
The above-referenced cases as well as other sources27 indicate that the
burden of asserting such exemptions in a pre-judgment proceeding brought
by a creditor is almost exclusively upon the debtor. If the primary purpose
for granting a hearing to a debtor before a writ of attachment, garnishment,
or replevin is rendered by the court, is to fulfill due process requirements, then
it would seem to follow that a hearing where the debtor is present should be
required by law. This is necessary to give the debtor the opportunity to assert
such exemptions if they exist or to dispel any possibility that the property in
question is so exempted. Such is not the case with the new Ohio law2" and it
has been suggested that the constitutionality of that law is suspect.29
The Ohio law pertaining to debtors' property" that is exempted from the
reach of creditors is inextricably bound up with the federal law of exemptions
in the bankruptcy area.31 In passing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Con-
gress permitted the individual states to opt out of the federal exemptions by
enacting their own law in this area. The 113th Ohio General Assembly exercised
this option in 1979 and enacted H.B. 674.32 House Bill 674 "provides exemp-
and a Prompt Postseizure Hearing for Postjudgment Garnishment 46 Mo. L. REV. 857 (1981); Note,
Finberg v. Sullivan: Protecting Exempt Funds From Postjudgment Seizure, 3 CARDozo L. REV. 171 (1981),
Note, Due Process Considerations and Arizona's Post-judgment Garnishment Provisions, 1981 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 1085; Note, Pennsylvania's Postjudgment Garnishment Procedures Violate the Due Process and
Supremacy Clauses 26 VILL. L. REV. (1981).
"General Motors Corporation v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980), noted at 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 729-730
(1980).
215 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(1) & (2) (1982).
"Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971); noted at 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 258 (1972); 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 856, 858 (1972).
"This observation was concurred in by both Mark A. Vander Laan, author of part V, Exemptions and
their Assertions, found in Ohio Legal Center Institute, Provisional Remedies (1982), at 5.09,and Terry
Sanford, an assistant vice-president at Centran Bank of Akron, in a conversation on October 25, 1982.
"See infra, § 2.06-2.08, for analysis of the hearing request forms, and a discussion of new sections 2715.041,
2716.06, 2716.13, and 2737.05. These sections make clear that a hearing is required only in those
circumstances where a debtor actually asserts his statutory right to one. Such a statutory scheme assumes
that debtors are able to both understand their rights and to freely exercise them.
"See supra note 15.
"See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A). See also the Ohio cases collected in Simler & Jackson v.
Jennings, 23 Ohio Op. 3d 571 n.25, (S.D. Ohio 1982) for the judicial application of these exemptions
in specific cases.
'll U.S.C. 101-109 (1979).
"See Note, H.B. 674: Ohio Opts Out of the Federal Bankruptcy Exemptions and Revises Its Exemption
Laws, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461, 462 n. 14, (1980) for the explanation as to how this was legislatively and
constitutionally executed. See generally, Fisher, The Federal Exemption Scheme: Delayed Until 1983 for
Ohio Bankrupts, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 791 (1980).
[Vol. 16:3
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tions for Ohio debtors in U.S. bankruptcy court as well as in state
court.. . ."" Those exemptions pertaining to post-judgment garnishment of
personal earnings3" are especially important since the vast majority of creditor-
instigated actions to collect on the debts is via the post-judgment garnishment
of personal earnings procedure.35
1.03 The Case Law Background: State Level
The creators of H.B. 254 were responding to three cases at the state level
when they drafted the bill. Those cases were Farmers Savings & Trust Co. v.
Ridenour, 36 Simler and Jackson v. Jennings, 37 and Peebles v. Clement. 38 The
cases dealt with, respectively, the constitutionality of Ohio's pre-judgment
replevin statute, post-judgment garnishment law, and its pre-judgment attach-
ment statute. In responding to the Ridenour holding, the legislature was,
indirectly, also coming to grips with the decision rendered in Turner v. Block, 39
a federal district court opinion that had gone unreported and largely unnoticed"
for over six years.
The Ridenour holding focused upon three major defects that were found
in the then-existing section of the Ohio Revised Code that dealt with pre-
judgment replevin (Chapter 2737). Those defects were:
(1) the lack of any requirement for the party seeking the writ of replevin
to set forth specific facts concerning the wrongful detention of its
property by the debtor;
(2) The fact that a non-judicial officer (the clerk of courts) was empowered
to issue the writ;
(3) The fact that there was no requirement for a speedy post-seizure
hearing in order to explore the validity of the issuance of the writ and
to ascertain if the debtor had been harmed in any way by the taking
of the property."'
Despite the holdings of the Ridenour and Turner courts, Chapter 2737 remained
unchanged until H.B. 254 became law. The law continued to exist in its un-
constitutional form until the new legislation became effective because of the
"See Note, supra note 32, at 462.
"3OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(13)(a) and (b) (Page 1981).
"Terry Sanford and Lawrence Walsh, in separate conversations, concurred that the garnishment of wages
was the remedy that creditors employed most often to obtain the money owed to them.
3659 Ohio Misc. 128, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 370, 394 N.E.2d 1039 (Crawford City. Mun. Ct. 1979).
"23 Ohio Op. 3d 554 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
"63 Ohio St. 2d 314, 408 N.E.2d 689 (1980); see Note Peebles v. Clement: Creditor's v. Remedies Under
Attack in Ohio, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 397 (1980) and, Note, Prejudgment & Attachment ... Due Process,
86 COM. L.J. 58 (1981).
"12 Ohio Op. 3d 373 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
"The Turner opinion was finally reprinted in 1979 only because of the reliance the Ridenour court placed
on it. 12 Ohio Op. 3d 370, 371 n.l, 394 N.E.2d at 1041 n.1.
"Ohio Op. 3d at 372, 394 N.E.2d at 1041. The Turner holding emphasized the second factor mentioned.
12 Ohio Op. 3d at 374.
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common practice of "amending" those unconstitutional procedures contained
in the statute via local rules of court. 2
The Peebles opinion, as previously noted, 3 presented the first opportunity
for the Ohio Supreme Court to expound upon the Sniadach line of United States
Supreme Court cases. The court reached the conclusion that those cases demand-
ed the fulfillment of five separate criteria before sufficient due process has been
afforded by the courts to a debtor in a pre-judgment attachment proceeding. 4
The Peebles court focused on only one of those criteria in reaching its deci-
sion: the need for judicial supervision from the very beginning of the attach-
ment proceeding .4 Since the then-existing pre-judgment replevin and garnish-
ment (of property other than personal earnings) statutes were virtually iden-
tical in this regard, 6 the Ohio Supreme Court had, by inference, effectively
declared all of the major provisional creditors' remedies in Ohio at least partially
unconstitutional.
Ohio's scheme for post-judgment garnishment of personal wages was
closely scrutinized in Simler and Jackson v. Jennings7 and was found to be
lacking in several important respects. This recent federal district court case con-
vincingly demonstrated the increasingly intensified conflict between the creditor's
demands for payment and the rights of debtors to continue in possession of
any exempted property they may own."
The Simler court touched upon a number of procedural aspects of the
post-judgment garnishment of wages procedure that, cumulatively, permitted
the possibility of a debtor's property being wrongfully taken, even if only
temporarily. 9 The court, applying the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge,"0
formulated a set of criteria5' that, "at a minimum," had to be met before the
"The Ridenour court did not look kindly upon this acknowledged mechanism of salvaging what would
otherwise be bad law. The effect of its holding in this regard was, due to its limited jurisdiction, minimized.
"See supra note 12.
"See infra, § 2.03 where the five criteria are set out in full.
"63 Ohio St. 2d at 322, 408 N.E.2d at 694.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.11, 2737.02 (Page 1981).
23 Ohio Op. 3d 554 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
"One of the plaintiffs in the Simler case, Ralph S. Drummond, was an 85-year old retiree whose Social
Security and Veteran's Administration benefits, having been automatically deposited in his bank account
and being exempt from execution under Federal law, were the subject of an order of garnishment. The
other plaintiff, Veronica Jackson, was a mother of three minor children whose disposable income was
$50 per week. As the head of a household, this income was exempted from garnishment under §
2329.66(A)(13), yet some of her wages were garnisheed by a creditor in one of the proceedings that caused
the Simler court to review Ohio's garnishment statute. Simler, 23 Ohio Op. 3d at 555-56.
"Those aspects included: (a) certainty of notice to the debtor (at 293,296,307); (b) the ability of the debtor'
to effectively pursue an appeal through the state court system (at 300); (c) the adequacy of the communicative
content of the notice (at 307); (d) notice of the possibility of exemptions and other defenses to the creditor's
action (at 308); and (e) affording a debtor the right to a prompt post-seizure hearing (at 308).
"See supra § 1.02(a) for discussion of the relevance of this case. As the Simler court put it: "The final
factor to consider in weighing the various interests of the parties is the administrative and fiscal burden
additional or substitute procedures would entail." 23 Ohio Op. 3d at 571.
5 Thus, at a minimum, such procedures should include prompt service of the notice of garnishment
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:3
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Ohio post-judgment garnishment of wages statute could be said to afford the
amount of due process required by the United States Constitution. It seems
relatively clear that the individuals responsible for H.B. 254 had the due pro-
cess criteria in mind when drafting the legislation.52 Whether they have gone
unnecessarily far beyond those requirements in their reformulation of Chapters
2715, 2716, and 2737 of the Ohio Revised Code is a conclusion that will be
drawn over the coming months and years by courts, attorneys, creditors, and
debtors.
1.04 The Mechanics of Legislative Drafting - Some Semantic
Ambiguities in H.B. 254
Because H.B. 254 was produced with the input of "interest groups from
different sides of the spectrum" 53 it contains a certain amount of semantic am-
biguity within its provisions that will provide hurdles to its effective implemen-
tation. The two ambiguities that are particularly worth noting involve (1) timing
of the service upon the defendant, and how it relates to the defendant's ability
to request a post-seizure hearing, and (2) the definition of the term "indigent"
and how it relates to the necessity of posting bond in a pre-judgment
proceeding.5 '
The defendant's ability to maintain possession of the property being sub-
jected to the pre-judgment proceeding until such time as the creditor's suit pro-
ceeds to a trial on the merits is directly related to his ability to either claim
that the property is exempt or to post a bond equivalent to the one posted by
the creditor pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 2715.10. Whether a defen-
dant can avoid the bond requirement by being deemed "indigent" is a crucial
conclusion to be reached by the court, especially if the property in question
is an integral part of the defendant's existence. Yet H.B. 254 sets forth no criteria
by which courts will be able to ascertain whether a particular defendant is
"indigent." While any such criteria would have to be flexible in order to
accommodate the varying standards of living in communities around Ohio,"
they could be linked to the existing standards in each community for qualifying
for welfare.
upon the judgment debtor; a notice explaining that defenses, including exemptions, may be available
which would nullify the garnishment and restore the assets, with a description of a simple procedure
for requesting a hearing; and a prompt hearing and decision on the claimed defense. . . [these
procedures] do balance the various competing interests by giving appropriate weight to the rights
of debtors to keep their exempt property available to meet and pay for life's necessities.
23 Ohio Op. 3d at 571.
"See supra note 6, William Weisenberg. A close examination of various parts of H.B. 254 reveals that
there are several places where the specific language of those two holdings was incorporated into the new
law. See supra note 14; see infra note 170, 179.
"See supra note 6. Conversation with Dennis Papp.
"See, with respect to the first mentioned ambiguity, § 2715.044 (last paragraph); and § 2715.10 (last
paragraph). With respect to the second mentioned ambiguity, various provisions of § 2716.13 are pertinent.
"See Bureau of Research and Analysis/Department of Economic and Community Development, Poverty
in Ohio (1974), Tables 1-2, at 7 which shows that the number of people living at or below the poverty
level in Ohio communities ranges, on a percentage basis, from a low of 7.5% to a high of 20.2%.
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Sections 2716.13(A), (C)(1), (C)(1)(b), and (D), and analogous provisions,5 6
provide an interesting example of what may happen if notice of any action
brought under chapters 2715, 2716, and 2737 is not immediately served. Under
2716.13(A), upon the filing of "an action in garnishment" of property other
than wages, the clerk of courts shall set a hearing on the matter "within twelve
days." Under 2716.13(C)(1), notice and a "hearing request form"5" shall be
served upon the defendant no later than seven days prior to the day on which
the hearing has been scheduled. The type of service to be utilized is set forth
in 2716.13(D) as being "ordinary or regular mail," unless the plaintiff requests
otherwise. Within the statutorily mandated "hearing request form," the defen-
dant is notified that he has five business days upon receipt of the notice to
request the post-seizure hearing defined in 2716.13(A). If he does not do so,
then, under 2716.13(C)(2), that hearing is automatically cancelled.58
Difficulties may occur in attempting to accommodate, within a twelve-
day time frame, both service upon the defendant at least seven days before
the hearing date and the defendant's statutory right to request a hearing within
five days after receiving the notice and hearing request form. Under the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure,59 twelve days is not twelve "business" days. It is
twelve consecutive days, including holidays and weekends. If a garnishment
proceeding is filed on Friday, November 19, 1982, service would have to be
made on the defendant by Wednesday, November 24, since the hearing on that
action would be scheduled for December 1. It seems safe to predict that there
will be many situations where debtors will not be served within the specified
number of days.
Even if the defendant is not served within the allotted time span, it is likely
that it will not matter. If the experience of one municipal court under the new
law is representative, approximately 1.5% of all such defendants actually request
a hearing in one form or another.6° Yet, one can postulate the case where a
defendant is served less than five days before the hearing, desires that hearing
and has legitimate reaons for challenging the creditor's garnishment of his pro-
perty. Under the statutory scheme set for in H.B. 254, such a defendant would
be denied the hearing unless he promptly requested it; the order of garnish-
ment would be issued by the court.6 ' While provision is made for a court-
granted continuance of the scheduled hearing date,' 2 the defendant, in most
5"See infra § 2.09-2.12, 3.05, discussing, respectively, § 2715.04-2715.041, 2716.05-2716.06.
"See infra § 2.07.
"See infra § 3.05.
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 6(A). This is suggested by the analysis in the reprint of Special Session: Attachments,
Garnishments, and Replevins (Am. Sub. H.B. 254), published by the Ohio Judicial College, at 32.
6"The approximate figures from the Akron Municipal Court were three requests for a post-seizure hearing
out of 150 debtors served for the period from August 16, 1982-November 3, 1982. Conversation with
Larry Walsh, supra note 14.
"OOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2716.13(C)(2) and (C)(5) (Page Supp. 1983).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2716.13(C)(3).
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cases, will be ignorant of this provision and not avail himself of it. In this situa-
tion, a deserving defendant will not have been given notice of the garnishment
and the opportunity for a hearing before a taking of his property, as is re-
quired by the Sniadach line of cases.
The small chance of this chain of events actually occurring makes it unlikely
that H.B. 254 will be declared unconstitutional for this reason.63 If, however,
amendments to H.B. 254 are contemplated, the Ohio General Assembly should
seriously consider amending the service and timing provisions."
2.00 Pre-judgment Attachment Procedures
2.01 Grounds for Pre-judgment Attachment - R.C. § 2715.01
This section sets forth the circumstances under which an attachment of
personal property may be obtained and the grounds upon which a pre-judgment
attachment will be effected. These twelve grounds remain virtually unchanged
by the 1982 act.65 The only substantive change is found in subsection (11) which
has eliminated as a ground for pre-judgment attachment the fact that plain-
tiff's claim is for necessaries.
Despite the use of permissive language throughout the new act, the addi-
tion of subsection (D) makes it clear that pre-judgment attachment may be
obtained only pursuant to this section. This specifically eliminates the use
of any other possible statutory or common law concept upon which the creditor
may base a claim to obtain possession of an item.
2.02 Definitions - R.C. § 2715.011
This section has been added in its entirety by the new act. The terms which
are defined: probable cause to support the motion, levying officer, and occupied
dwelling unit are also new.
"Probable cause to support the motion" is defined as support which
demonstrates that it is likely that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against
the defendant.67 Although the statute does not delineate the degree of likelihood
which is actually required, the indications are that the creditor must demonstrate
"Once again, the third factor contained within the balancing test of the Mathews v. Eldridge case should
be examined: ". . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail." Such language would seem to militate against a potential finding of
unconstitutionality.
'At this time, no such amendments have been formally proposed, but, according to William Weisenberg,
the possibility of such amendments is being considered by the Ohio Clerk of Courts Association and a
sub-committee of the Ohio State Bar Association. See supra note 6.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Page Supp. 1983).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Page 1982). An attachment against the property, other than personal
earnings, of a defendant may be accomplished prior to the entry of judgment only pursuant to an attachment
proceeding under this chapter.
"1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.011 (Page Supp. 1983). "Probable cause to support the motion" means
that it is likely that a plaintiff who files a motion for attachment pursuant to section 2715.03 of the Revised
Code will obtain judgment against the defendant against whom the motion was filed that entitles the plaintiff
to a money judgment that can be satisfied out of the property that is the subject of the motion.
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that it is more likely than not that he will prevail in the case using a generally
accepted standard.
Unlike the prior act, officers other than a sheriff are given the authority
to levy an order of attachment against property. The levying officer is any person
who is authorized and directed by the order of attachment to levy on the
property. 68 This definition may be used to expand the number of people who
may be involved in the levying process.
An occupied dwelling is defined as any structure which is used as a
household or residence by one or more persons. 69 A structure is not an occupied
dwelling if reasonable efforts to contact a person of the household have failed
and the leving officer or the person making the efforts to contact the occupant
reasonably believes that no person is in the structure at that time.
2.03 Contents of Affidavit - R.C. § 2715.03
The previous version of section 2715.03 provided that the creditor, his
attorney or agent could submit an affidavit for cause to the clerk of court who
could then issue the order of attachment."0 This section was found unconstitu-
tional by the Ohio Supreme Court in Peebles v. Clement. 71 The court was faced
with a line of decisions which have been handed down by the United States
Supreme Court beginning with Snidach v. Family Finance Corp.,72 in which
the Supreme Court has attempted to define the scope of pre-judgment and gar-
nishment statutes.
Based primarily upon the later Supreme Court cases of Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant 3 and North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem Inc., 4 the Ohio Supreme
Court determined:
[a] statute providing for pre-judgment attachment must at a minimum:
"Id. "Levying Officer" means the sheriff or other authorized law enforcement officer who is ordered
by the court to take possession of property under an order of attachment.
"Id. "Occupied dwelling unit" means a structure that is used in whole or in part as a home, residence,
or sleeping place by one person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain
a common household and the facilities and appurtenances in it and in which any person is present or is
likely to be present, except that such a structure is not an occupied dwelling unit at any time if after reasonable
efforts to personally contact any person who may be present in the structure at that time, the person who
made the efforts reasonably believes that no person is present in the structure at that time.
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03 (Page 1981). An order of attachment shall be made by the clerk of court
in which the action is brought in any case mentioned in section 2615.01 of the Revised Code, when there
is filed in his office an affidavit of the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney, showing:
(A) The nature of the plaintiff's claim;
(B) That it is just;
(C) The amount which the affiant believes the plaintiff ought to recover;
(D) The existence of any one of the grounds for an attachment enumerated in such section.
Such affidavit may be made before any person authorized to administer oaths whether an attorney in
the case or not.
"63 Ohio St. 2d 314, 408 N.E.2d 689 (1980).
"395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3416 U.S. 600 (1974).
"419 U.S. 601 (1974).
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(1) require plaintiff to furnish an appropriate bond or other security to
compensate a defendant in the event of wrongful seizure: (2) require that
an affidavit be filed alleging personal knowledge of specific facts form-
ing the basis for pre-judgment seizure; (3) require that a judicial officer
pass upon the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the affidavit; (4) provide
for dissolution of the seizure upon the posting of a bond by defendant;
and (5) provide an immediate right of hearing to the defendant in which
plaintiff must prove that the seizure is warranted.75
The new pre-judgment attachment statute must not only conform with
the specific mandates of Peebles, but is must also pass constitutional muster
in its application. There is an indication that the Ohio Supreme Court's reliance
upon Mitchell and Di-Chem was misplaced 6 and that the court should have
applied the standard as set for in Fuentes v. Shevin" or a more effective com-
bination of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions.
In light of the Ohio Supreme Court mandates, section 2715.03 has been
reconstructed. 8 The plaintiff's affadavit must now specifically state the facts
upon which his claim is based. The affidavit must include the amount of plain-
tiff's claim and a copy of any written instrument upon which the claim is based.
The requirement of the production of the written instrument if the claim is
based upon an instrument is consistent with the requirements of Ohio Rule
of Civil Procedure 10(D).7 9
The plaintiff is also required to state facts which support at least one of
the grounds of attachment enumerated in section 2715.01.8° Although the sec-
tion does not specifically state a requirement for specific delineation, it is
reasonable to believe that any grounds which are used as a basis for attach-
ment must be specified as falling within section 2715.01. The affidavit may
contain several alternative, non-exclusive grounds for attachment but each
ground should be accompanied and supported by its own set of facts. This
is not to say that the same set of facts or a segment thereof could not be used
to support two or more separate grounds for attachment. Subsection (B) is
more restrictive and is designed to elicit more specific, exacting information
as to the plaintiff's particular claim for attachment.
Subsection (C) now requires the plaintiff to present a description of the
property. 8' The plaintiff must also state the approximate value of the property
"63 Ohio St. 2d 314, 321, 408 N.E.2d 589, 693 (1980).
6Note, Peebles v. Clement: Creditors' Prejudgment Remedies Under Attack in Ohio, 10 CAP. U.L. REV.
397, 413 (1980).
"1407 U.S. 67 (1972).
"See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03 (Page Supp. 1983).
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 10. When any claim or defense is founded on an account or other written instrument,
a copy thereof must be attached to the pleadings. If not so attached, the reason for the omission must
be stated in the pleading.
1OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
"OHIo REV CODE ANN. § 2715.03(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
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sought. It should be noted that this may be different from the prior section
which required the plaintiff to state the amount which he believed he was entitled
to recover. There are several conceivable situations in which the two amounts
would not be the same.
82
Subsection (D) requires the plaintiff to specify the location where the pro-
perty may be found.83 Although this may appear to be an intrinsic part of the
attachment proceeding with regard to efficiency, it is also important as an ele-
ment of sufficiency of the affidavit. Throughout the series of pre-judgment
attachment cases the Supreme Court's main focus has been on the prevention
of mistaken seizure of goods.8 ' Increased specificity in the initial affidavit is
one method by which the courts and legislatures have sought to accomplish
this objective.
Subsection (E) is an original provision which again requires that the infor-
mation be based upon the plaintiff's own knowledge. Since the affidavit may
be made by the plaintiff, his attorney or his agent, the wording of this subsec-
tion may present more conceptual problems rather than actual complications.
A literal reading of the section requires an attorney to attest to facts which
were personally known by the plaintiff. The conceptual complications lie in
the fact that an affiant must swear to the actual belief and knowledge of a
third person in some circumstances.
This provision is also designed to protect the debtor from unfounded or
mistaken pre-judgment attachments in the sense that the property is exempt
from attachment proceedings. The exemptions recognized by law serve to take
property held by the debtor outside the immediate reach of a prejudgment
attachment action.
The new pre-judgment attachment portion of the statute places the burden
upon the plaintiff to show that the property sought is not exempt from attach-
ment proceedings.85 This is contrasted with any possible burden which could
have been placed upon the debtor in claiming the exemption. The exemptions
to which the defendant is entitled are set forth in section 2329.66 of the Revised
Code and have not been substantively changed by the new act.
86
"Although this section does not define "value," it is reasonable to believe that "value" pertains to the
fair market value of the item at the time of the filing. If an item depreciates at a rate which is more rapid
than the value covered by the accumulated payments, the amount to which plaintiff is entitled to recover
would be in excess of the actual value of the property. The more likely circumstance, however, is the situation
where the fair market value of the property exceeds the amount to which plaintiff is entitled to recover.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
"Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). In this case the Court stated:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair
process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this
requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly,
is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment - to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when
the State seizes goods simply upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03(E) (Page Supp. 1983).
"6OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1983).
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Because of the different requirements which may be made with respect
to property in the debtor's possession and property in the possession of a third
party,8 7 subsection (F) requires that the affiant specifically state the name of
any third party in possession of the property.8 The provision does not require
that the belief come from the plaintiff's personal knowledge, but it appears
that the statement may be based on information related to the affiant by another,
even disinterested party.
The provision which permitted the affidavit to be made before any per-
son authorized to administer oaths has been deleted. The change is the result
of the requirement and new inclusion that the affidavit and application for
attachment must be made before the court. These modifications are an attempt
to place the pre-judgment attachment procedure within the full control of the
court from the inception. Control of the proceeding by the clerk has been
specifically found not to afford adequate due process protection.89
2.04 Notice Requirements to Defendants - R.C. § 2715.04
Section 2715.04 now incorporates the due process requirement of prior
notice and an opportunity for a hearing.9" In order to receive a hearing on
the motion for attachment, the defendant must make a written request to the
court within five business days after receipt of the attachment." If the notice
is received by the defendant on a Friday, he has until the following Friday to
provide the court with the written notice for a hearing.
This request permits the defendant to state his reasons for disputing the
attachment but does not require the defendant to do so. The statements made
in the defendant's request for a hearing will not prevent him from raising ad-
ditional defenses during the hearing or trial. The failure of the defendant to
include a statement of reasons for dispute with the request for a hearing does
not constitute a waiver of his right to present additional defenses nor a waiver
of the defendant's right to pursue the actual pre-attachment hearing.'9 A defen-
dant may decline to state any reasons for his disputing the attachment in his
initial request for a hearing. The presence or absence of stated reasons apparently
has no persuasive effect on the outcome of the hearing on the motion for
attachment.
"
7See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.091 (Page Supp. 1983).
"OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.03(F) (Page Supp. 1983).
"Snidach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.04 (Page Supp. 1983).
91Id.
"In Computer Leasing Co. v. Computing & Software, Inc., 37 Ohio Misc. 19,21, 306 N.E.2d 191,193
(1973), the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas found:
if the pre-seizure hearing is to be fair (in the sense of allowing both sides an opportunity to present
their available, good-faith legal arguments) and to provide a real test (in the sense of allowing the
court to consider all relevant factual and legal matters before making a decision), such a hearing
must include the right to raise affirmative defenses.
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A defendant is given notice of the time and place of the hearing at the
time he receives the notice of a motion for attachment. 93 If the defendant's
written request for a hearing is not made within the allotted time, the hearing
is cancelled, and the motion for attachment shall provide the basis for a deter-
mination of sufficiency.94 Even if the request for a hearing is not presented
to the court by the defendant within the five business days, the court is given
the discretion to grant a continuance as provided within section 2715.042(B). 95
The failure of the defendant to respond will actually result in an exparte pro-
ceeding, but the defendant is at least given the initial opportunity to participate
in the attachment proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
due process as only requiring the defendant prior notice and an opportunity
for a hearing.9"
2.05 Examples of Sufficient Notice to Defendants - R.C. § 2714.041
Section 2715.041 is new in its entirety. When the plaintiff files the affidavit
and motion, he or she must also file a praecipe instructing the clerk of court
to notify the defendant of the motion which has been filed. 97 It should be noted
that the clerk now becomes involved only after the court has approved the
motion and accepted the affidavit. Even at this stage the clerk is not given any
discretion in the course of action which he may take. This notice to the defen-
dant is the instrument which upon its receipt by the defendant begins the time
period within which the defendant must file the request for a hearing under
section 2715.04.98
The notice requirements are stated in example form in this subsection.
Although the provision states that a notice must only substantially comply with
the given example, there is an indication that a deviation of any degree from
the stated form would be insufficent. A prudent plaintiff would be wise to adhere
closely to the requirements and the form as set forth in this section. If the form
of the plaintiff's notice is different from that which is actually provided in sec-
tion 2715.041, it must provide the same type of notice and incorporate the
elements of adequate notice as defined in sections 2715.04 and 2715.041.
The notice apparently must contain a condensed list of exemptions to which
the defendant may be entitled." The actual listing of these exemptions pro-
vides the unwary debtor with information upon which he may base any dispute
or initial defense to the motion for attachment. The notice also must specifically
state that a debtor's wages may not be attached before a judgment has been
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.04 (Page Supp. 1983).
"Id.
9"Id.
'Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
"9OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.041 (Page Supp. 1983).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.041(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
99d.
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entered against him. This provision eliminates any doubt that wage garnishments
will not be enforced absent a final judgment. This requirement is consistent
with the United States Supreme Court mandates in Snidach v. Family Finance
Corp. 100
The list of exempted property and benefits provided to the defendant in
the notice required by section 2715.041 is not exhaustive. ' The apparent
necessity of a benefit or item to the defendant may also bear on the defen-
dant's ability to dispute the plaintiff's claim. It should be noted, however, that
showing that the item is a necessity has been specifically deleted in section
2715.01.
The notice must also state that the defendant has the right to a hearing
on the motion.'0 2 The notice reiterates the requirements for adequacy as pro-
vided in section 2715.04. 103 The notice also provides that a defendant may retain
possession of the property pending final judgment upon the posting of a
surety. 104
If the defendant fails to post the bond or request a hearing, he is advised
that the property in his possession may be attached without further notice. This
notice gives the defendant two separate alternatives which will allow him to
retain possession of the property pending a hearing on the motion for attach-
ment. Absent the defendant requesting a hearing or posting a bond, the order
of attachment may be granted in a non-adversarial setting.
Subsection (B) provides the form which may be used as a hearing request.
Although the actual language of the request for hearing form may differ from
that provided, it must be in substantial compliance with the basic requirements
of the request for hearing as set forth in section 2715.041. The clerk is instructed
to include the request in the notice of the motion. From the structure included
in section 2715.041 it appears that the request for hearing may be attached
as a part of the actual notice either as a part of the same page or an additional
page in the series of documents served upon the defendant. It should be
specifically and emphatically stated that the request for a hearing must be
'00395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'°'See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1983) for the complete list of exemptions available
to the defendant.
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.041 (Page Supp. 1983).
'01d. The "notice" includes the following paragraphs:
If you dispute the plaintiffs claim and believe that you are entitled to retain possession of the property
because it is exempt or for any other reason, you may request a hearing before this court by disputing
the claim in the request for hearing form appearing below, or in a substantially similar form, and
delivering the request for the hearing to this court, at the office of (Title of court official), not
later than the end of the fifth business day after you receive this notice. You may state your reasons
for disputing the claim in the space provided on the form, but you are not required to do so. If
you do state your reasons for disputing the claim in the space provided on the form, you are not
prohibited from stating any other reasons at the hearing, and if you do not state your reasons,
it will not be held against you by the court and you can state your reasons at the hearing.
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returned to the court within five days after receipt. The notice must also state
that failure to return the request within the specified time constitutes waiver
of the defendant's right to a hearing and to retain the possession of the
property.'"0
Subsection (C) requires that notice of the motion for attachment be served
on the defendant at least seven days prior to the date of the hearing.' °6 The
notice of a hearing must be accompanied by the complaint and summons in
accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Service may also be made by
publication and the number of weeks required by the civil rules may be
diminished by the court as it deems appropriate.'""
Section 2715.041 provides the framework which allows the defendant an
ample opportunity to be hear and provides the defendant with sufficient notice
of the motion for attachment which has been filed. The section may actually
provide the defendant with more notice and pre-judgment protection than he
is constitutionally entitled to, but the Ohio legislature has apparently decided
to afford the defendant with a fuller amount of pre-judgment protection.
2.06 Granting the Order of Attachment Without
a Hearing - R.C. § 2715.042
The court is still empowered under section 2715.042 to issue an order of
attachment without affording the defendant a prior hearing. The circumstances
under which this may take place are outlined in this new section.
Subsection (A) provides that the court may issue the order in the event
that the defendant does not respond to the section 2715.041 notice.'0 9 The court
may grant a continuance under subsection (B),if it finds a reasonable justifica-
tion for the delay.
2.07 Defendant's Hearing on the Motion - R.C. § 2715.043
Section 2715.043 requires the hearing on a motion for attachment be held
within twenty days after the motion has been filed. ' 0 The notice under section
2715.041 must be served on the defendant within thirteen days after the motion
was filed. Because of the nature of the proceedings, the plaintiff will want to
work within the minimum time limits as much as possible to protect his pro-
i'O3d.
'"This section provides:
The notice required by division (A) of this section shall be served on the defendant in duplicate
not less than seven business days prior to the date on which the hearing is scheduled, together with
a copy of the complaint and summons, if not previously served, and a copy of the motion for the
attachment of property and the affidavit attached to the motion, in the same manner as provided
in the Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of process.
1I7d.
"IOHIO R. Civ. P. 4.
'"'See generally OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.042 (Page Supp. 1983).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.043 (Page Supp. 1983).
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perty. The minimum time limits work to the advantage of the defendant in
that the property will ordinarily be taken from him immediately upon filing
the affidavit and motion.
This section also provides that the defendant shall receive notice of the
date, time and place of the hearing and that any failure on the part of the defen-
dant to avail himself of the hearing shall not constitute a waiver of his right
to present evidence in his defense at the trial.I' These requirements are incor-
porated and manifested in the notice and request for hearing example forms
included in section 2715.041.
2.08 Bond Requirements - R.C. § 2715.044
Section 2715.044 outlines the uses to which the bond will be put upon final
judgment.'"2 The posting of bond is an absolute mandate for the plaintiff. Until
the plaintiff posts bond, the order of attachment will not be effective.
Before the court will grant the order for attachment, the plaintiff must
post bond in an amount twice the value of the property sought." 3 This bond
must be presented whether the hearing on the motion is held or attachment
is granted by default.
If judgment is ultimately rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff
is required to return the property or, at the defendant's election, pay an amount
which is equal to the value of the property in dispute. ' 14 In addition, the plain-
tiff must pay any damages which the defendant suffered as a result of the
mistaken detention or were caused by the plaintiff with respect to the defen-
dant's property. ",5
If the plaintiff does not know the value of the property sought, a bond
double the amount stated in the affidavit as the plaintiff's claim must be
posted."I 6 The value stated in the plaintiff's claim will also serve as the basis
for the amount of the bond if the plaintiff does know the identify of the pro-
perty sought. " I7
The plaintiff may avoid the bond requirement upon a showing of
'Id.
'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.044 (Page Supp. 1983) states:
An order of attachment issued by a court shall not be effective until the plaintiff that filed the
motion for attachment files with the court a bond to the defendant against whom the motion was
filed, executed by the plaintiff's surety, in an amount twice the approximate value of the property
to be attached under the order, to the effect that, should judgment be issued against the plaintiff,
the plaintiff will return the property taken or pay the value so assessed, at the election of the
defendant, and also pay the damages suffered by the defendant as a result of the taking and detention
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indigency. 8 The indigency exception may be recognized by the court on its own
motion or through a motion by the plaintiff."I9 The result may be a complete
waiver of the bond requirement or a reduction in the amount which is required.' 20
2.09 Summary Attachment Proceedings - R.C. § 2715.045
Because of the competing interests in the property sought, there will be
occasions when the plaintiff's need for immediate possession of the property
outweighs the defendant's right to retain the property. The United States Supreme
Court has specifically recognized that the plaintiff may have a substantial pro-
perty interest which must also be protected during the course of the proceedings.' 2'
Although the plaintiff must generally file his motion and affidavit and give
notice to the defendant prior to obtaining an order for attachment, the legislature
through section 2715.045 has recognized that there may be circumstances in which
this procedure will not afford the plaintiff adequate protection for the property. 22
The United States Supreme Court, in Fuentes, has also recognized these unusual
situations and has granted exceptions for them.' 23
The Ohio legislature has stated that a plaintiff must show one of two possible
contingencies in order to receive summary attachment treatment.'2 The plain-
tiff must demonstrate irreparable injury in that there is a present danger of con-
cealment or disposition of the property.' 25 In the alternative, the plaintiff may
be able to demonstrate that the value of the property will be substantially im-
paired if an order for attachment is not immediately issued. 26
If the court finds the existence of either of these circumstances it may issue
the order for attachment before a hearing is set.' 27 In granting the order the
court must direct the clerk to immediately serve upon the defendant a copy of
the complaint and summons, the motion, and a copy of the order for
attachment.' 28
"'Id. "If the plaintiff is indigent, the court may, on motion of the plaintiff or on its own motion, waive





'See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
"'
22OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.045 (Page Supp. 1983) provides:
Upon the filing of a motion for attachment, the court may issue an order of attachment without
issuing notice to the defendant against whom the motion was filed and without conducting a hearing
if the court finds that there is probable cause to support the motion and that the plaintiff that
filed the motion for attachment will suffer irreparable injury if the order is delayed until the defendant
against whom the motion has been filed has been given the opportunity for a hearing. The court's
finding shall be based upon the motion and affidavit filed pursuant to section 2715.03 of the Revised
Code and any other relevant evidence that it may wish to consider.
"1407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).




"'See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.045(C)(1).
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The example of a notice as set forth in subsection (C)(1) is substantively
the same as the notice provided in section 2715.041.129 Even though the defen-
dant's property has been summarily attached he will be given ample opportunity
to present his defenses in a prompt manner.' 30 Upon receipt of the request for
a hearing on the order for attachment the court shall set the hearing within three
days.' 3 ' If the defendant does not request a hearing, he has waived his rights
to object to the attachment until the trial.' 32
Subsection (E) permits the defendant to recover the attached property upon
a finding that there is not probable cause to support the plaintiff's motion. During
the hearing the burden is upon the defendant to demonstrate the lack of pro-
bable cause.'33
2.10 Issuance of the Order for Attachment - R.C. § 2715.05
Section 2715.05 has been amended to specifically require the court to issue
the order for attachment.' 3 This change erases any possibility that the order
may be issued by a clerk of the court.
The court now has the authority to direct an officer in any county within
the state to attach property found within that county. 3 This provision greatly
expands the reach of the court in attaching property in the possession of the
defendant.
The 1982 version of section 2715.05 contains a new subsection (B) which
requires the order for attachment list the names of the parties and a statement
that a bond for the property has been filed pursuant to seciton 2715.10 or
2715.26. 136 This requirement further protects the defendant against any mistaken
attachments or frivolous and malicious proceedings.
Any subsequent attachments must be served upon the defendant pursuant
to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service of papers subsequent
'2'See supra note 109.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.045(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
'"OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.045(C)(1). The example notice states, "If you request a hearing, it will
be held within three business days after delivery of your request for hearing and notice of the date, time,
and place of the hearing will be sent to you."
"'Id. The notice sent to the defendant states:
If you do not request a hearing or file a bond before the end of the fifth business day after you
receive this notice, possession of the property will be withheld from you during the pendency of
the action. Notice of the dates, times, places, and purposes of any subsequent hearings and of the
date, time, and place of the trial of the action will be sent to you.
...OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.045(E) states: "If, after hearing, the court finds that there is not probable
cause to support the motion, it shall order that the property be redelivered to the defendant without the
condition of bond."
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.05 (Page Supp. 1983).
135d.
"6OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.05(B) (Page Supp. 1983) provides:
An order of attachment shall contain the names of the parties and the court in which the action
was brought and a statement that the property subject to the order of attachment can be retained
or recovered by filing a bond pursuant to section 2715.10 or 2715.26 of the Revised Code.
STUDENT PROJECTWinter, 1983]
21
Coleman et al.: Creditor's Rights in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
AKRON LAW REVIEW
to the service of the complaint. 1 3 This requirement still insures that the defen-
dant will have adequate notice of all proceedings against him.
2.11 Execution of the Order for Attachment - R.C. § 2715.09
Section 2715.09 provides the outline for the manner in which the order
for attachment must be executed. 38 In addition to leaving a copy of the order
with the occupant of the dwelling in which the property sought is located,
the officer must also leave a copy of the order with the defendant or at the
place where the items were detained. 3 9 The officer is generally required to take
physical possession of the property sought but will be permitted to execute the
attachment by posting a notice if it would be an unreasonable expense to remove
the item. 1'0
The requirement that the sheriff be accompanied by two witnesses has been
eliminated. The levying officer may now proceed alone but must still make
a true inventory of the items which were seized.
Subsection (B) is new to 2715.09 and now provides that the levying officer
may use any lawful means to enter the building or enclosure, other than an
occupied dwelling, in which the property sought may be located. '4 ' The officer
is first required to seek voluntary admittance into the structure; if he is unable
to secure that consent, he may enter the structure provided that it is done in
a lawful manner.' 2 If the officer is required to attach the property without
voluntary admittance he is required to file an affidavit with the court on the
next business day stating the reasons for the manner of attachment. 43 These
requirements are designed to eliminate the use of force or violence in attach-
ment proceedings.
2.12 Attachment of Property in the Possession of
Third Parties - R.C. § 2715.091
Section 2715.091 is a new addition to the pre-judgment attachment
statute. " This provision particularly addresses circumstances involving a reluc-
tant third party who is in possession of the property. Section 2715.091 pro-
vides that when attempts to attach personal property have failed, the officer
is directed to leave a copy of the notice of attachment with the garnishee.' 5
The officer is also required to leave an order that he appear in court and answer
the complaint. 6 This section enumerates the proper places for leaving notice
"'Id. See also, OHIo R. Civ. P. 4.
"'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.09 (Page Supp. 1983).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.09(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
140id.
"'See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.09(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
'42ld.
43Id
'See OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.091 (Page Sup. 1983).
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when the garnishee is not an individual.'" 7
Subsection (B) specifically states that only property sought for an attach-
ment is subject to the order. "8 Any attempts to garnish personal wages must
be accompanied by a final judgment.
2.13 Defendant's Objectives to the Surety - R.C. § 2715.43
The defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the surety given by the
plaintiff upon attachment.1 4 9 The defendant must file a motion in objection
to the surety within ten days after the surety's bond was filed. Once the objec-
tion has been filed, the officer shall still attach the property but must not take
any further action until the sufficiency of the surety is determined.' 5"
The surety requirement is designed to afford the defendant full protec-
tion from improper attachments. The bond sufficiency requirement will in-
sure that the defendant will recover the amount of the property which was sought
if the defendant should prevail as well as any damages which are attributable
to the wrongful attachment.
2.14 Recovery From Surety - R.C. § 2715.431
Section 2715.431 is a new addition in the 1982 act. This section specifi-
cally provides that a party may recover damages from the other party's surety
upon filing a complaint against the surety. '5' This provision permits the prevail-
ing party another source from which to recover money damages upon the out-
come of the proceedings.
2.15 Unaltered Sections in the 1982 Act.
Many of the parts of the prior pre-judgment attachment statute remain
bacially in tact. The following sections in this part underwent only minor,
cosmetic changes: 2715.06; 2715.12; 2715.13; 2715.17; 2715.19; 2715.20;
2715.21; 2715.24; 2715.25; 2715.26; 2715.29; 2715.30; 2715.31; 2715.32; 2715.37;
2715.38; 2715.39; 2715.40; 2715.44; 2715.46; and 2715.51.
3.00 Post-Judgment Garnishment"'
1471d.
1"See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.091(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.43 (Page Supp. 1983).
,5'Id.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.431 (Page Supp. 1983) states:
A party may seek recovery of damages awarded on final judgment and the costs of judgment
execution against the other party's surety on a bond filed pursuant to section 2715.044, 2715.10,
or 2715.26 of the Revised Code if execution of judgment issued in favor of that party is returned
unsatisfied, by the filing of a complaint against the surety in the same action in which the bond
was filed.
15224 0. Jur. 3d, Creditor's Rights § 268 (1980) defines postjudgment garnishment as "[a]n action . . .
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3.01 2716.01 - An Introductory Provision
This chapter has been added by H.B. 254 in an effort to integrate the
remedy of post-judgement garnishment within its own section of the Ohio
Revised Code. 53 Previously, garnishment was one of the several remedies con-
tained within chapter 2715 of the Ohio Revised Code.'14 Post-judgment garnish-
ment is divided into two separate categories: (a) post-judgment garnishment
of personal earnings is set out in R.C. § 2715.02-2715.10; and (b) post-judgment
garnishment of property other than personal earnings, is found in R.C. §
2716.11-2716.13. The latter sections may overlap, or even supersede, another
important remedy section contained within the Ohio Revised Code. " '
3.02 The 15-Day Demand - R.C. § 2716.02
This section contains the revised format for what is commonly called the
"15-day demand." The demand is made upon the debtor after judgment is
obtained and at least fifteen, but not more than forty-five, days before the
creditor would like to obtain the order of garnishment from the court.'56
As the new language indicates ("within 15 days of the date ... OF ITS
SERVICE BY THE COURT... we will go to court... UNLESS WE ARE
OTHERWISE PRECLUDED BY LAW FROM DOING SO." [New statutory
language in caps.]) the objective of the statute is to give the debtor the fullest
possible opportunity to be given notice of the creditor's intended action and
the fact that such action may be precluded by either the federal or state exempt-
ion schemes. The likelihood of the demand having as intimidating an effect
upon debtors as it once did is diminished by the substitution of the word "could"
for the word "can" in the sentence that refers to the effect that a garnishment
demand may have upon the debtor's continued employment by the gar-
nishee/debtor's employer. "
To avoid immediate garnishment by the creditor, the debtor is put on notice
by the fifteen-day demand that he must do one of three things in the fifteen
day period immediately following his receipt of the notice. The last alternative
involves the debtor doing one of two things: either applying for the appoint-
ment of a municipal court trustee to manage his earnings or entering into an
agreement for debt scheduling with a consumer credit counseling service 5 (new
...OHIO LEGAL CENTER INSTITUTE, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES 4.03 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OLCI].
1"See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.11-2715.19 (Page 1981).
"'See OLCI, supra note 153 at 5 referring to the "proceedings in aid of execution" sections of the R.C.
2333.09-2333.27 (Page 1981).
"'The form of the current 15-day demand was contained in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.02 (Page 1981),
under the pre-judgment attachment remedy.
"'A creditor is precluded from using the 15-day demand merely as a means to intimidate a debtor into
paying the debt owed. Either a suit must have been commenced or a judgment obtained before it can
be sent. Thomas v. Sun Furniture and Appliance Co., 61 Ohio App. 2d 78, 399 N.E.2d 567 (Hamilton
Cty. Ct. of Appeals 1978).
"'The consumer credit counseling service (CCCS) is essentially the counterpart of the municipal court
trustee in the private sector. A CCCS is a not-for-profit corporation organized under chapter 1702 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
[Vol. 16:3
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for this remedy in H.B. 254; hereinafter referred to as C.C.C.S.). As is ap-
parent both from the language retained from previous law and that which is
added here for the first time ("and notify us that you have applied for the
appointment of a trustee"), the burden is squarely upon the debtor to either
apply for a trustee's appointment or enter into an agreement with a C.C.C.S.,
and to promptly notify the creditor of his doing so.'9
3.03 The Creditor's Affidavit - R.C. § 2716.03
This part of H.B. 254, formerly § 2715.11, sets out the form of the affidavit
which the creditor must file with the court in order to proceed with the garnish-
ment threatened in the fifteen-day demand of § 2716.02. The substantive con-
tents of such an affidavit remain essentially unchanged by the new law.
Noticeable by its omission in either H.B. 254 or previous law is any explicit
requirement in this section that a written motion to the court for the issuance
of an order of garnishment be filed with the affidavit.' 16 Subsection (C) directly
tracks the language of the Simler holding when it requires that both the garnishee
and defendant are to be timely notified of the creditor's action of filing the
affidavit which requests the court to issue an order of garnishment.'
6
3.04 Order and Notice of Garnishment and Answer
of Employer - R. C. § 2716.05
The form of the "Order and Notice of Garnishment and Answer of
Employer" [hereinafter referred to as the "Order and Notice"] is set out in
§ 2716.05 as well as the procedure by which this form is served upon the
garnishee' 6, and answered by him.'63 Three copies of the "Order and Notice,"
in the form required by the statute, are left with the garnishee. One is to be
answered and returned to the court; another is to be kept by the garnishee for
his records; the third is to be delivered to the defendant by the garnishee along
with other documents that are required by Chapter 2716 to be left with the
garnishee for delivery to the debtor.
6
Judicial gloss indicates that the garnishee does not have to personally appear
before the clerk when making his answer to the "Order and Notice""'6 as would
119This is similar to the assertion of statutory exemptions where the burden is also upon the debtor. See
supra § 1.03(b).
"'Rule 7(b) of the OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE would seem to dictate this result.
"Simler, 23 Ohio Op. 3d at 569. The notice is given in accordance with the requirements of sections 2716.05
and 2716.06 (Page Supp. 1983)
"'For the potential effect upon the validity of the order of garnishment of having someone other than
a court-appointed person serving the order upon the garnishee, see Annot. 75 A.L.R. 2d 1433, 1433 (1961).
"'The form of the garnishee's answer is incorporated form OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1911.332 (Page Supp.
1982). See OCLI, supra note 153, at 4.10.
'"See infra § 3.05 for discussion of section 2716.06, for the potential significance of this and a listing
of the other forms that are required to be delivered to the debtor.
"'See OCLI, supra note 153, at 4.11, citing Peoples Bank & Savings Co, v. Katz, 146 Ohio St. 297, 65
N.E.2d 708 (1946). See pages 301-02 of the opinion, for a discussion of the garnishee's status as a party
to the garnishment proceeding and how it relates to the garnishee's answer.
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appear to be required by the language of 2716.05 ("the garnishee appear and
answer"). The garnishee can be compelled to appear personally, though, if
it appears that his answer to the "Order and Notice" was insufficient or
misleading in any way. 166
That "[tihe order shall bind the personal earnings of the defendant due
from the garnishee from the time of service" has been added by H.B. 254 is
significant. All of a debtor's earnings are frozen until such time as his employer
pays over the amount calculated according to the formula set out in the "Order
and Notice," which incorporates statutory standards.' 67
3.05 Notice to the Debtor - R.C. § 2716.06
The precise form that notice to the debtor should take is set forth in this
section. This aspect of the garnishment process, which the Simler court
emphasized in finding fault with the previous law, leaves the garnishee with
the responsibility of rendering notice to the defendant. Whether it is sound,
from a social-psychology point of view, for an employer to give that notice
"at the time [he] would otherwise pay the earnings which he is instead paying
to the courts" was apparently not a concern of those drafting H.B. 254.161
The actual written notice delivered by the garnishee to his employer con-
sists of three documents: (1) a copy of the "Order and Notice"; (2) a copy
of the "Notice to the Defendant"; and (3) a postage-paid, self-addressed
"Request for Hearing" form. The first is included so that the debtor will be
put on notice as to precisely how his employer calculated the amount of wages
that were, or are to be, sent to the court 169 in order that he can check those
calculations for their accuracy. The second is the Simler-engendered notice 70
that makes the debtor aware, in very straightforward language, that he has
the right to a hearing if he feels that either the order of garnishment is invalid
or that the amount to be garnisheed should be reduced by some applicable
'66The obligations and rights of garnishees are set out in detail in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2716.21 (Page
Supp. 1983).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A) (Page 1981).
"'The employer/garnishee's duty to give that notice is stated in both § 2716.05 and 2716.06(A). As for
the effect that garnishment has upon the employment relationship, see Kripke, Consumer Credit at pp.
289-95. The prohibition of 15 U.S.C. 1674(a) (1982), relating to the discharge of an employee due to a
single garnishment of his wages was necessary because of the adverse impact garnishment has historically
had upon the employment relationship. It has been suggested that this prohibition be expanded to include
the situation where the debtor is garnisheed by more than one creditor. See Consumer Research Foundation,
CRITIQUE OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 310 (1971).
"'It is never made entirely clear by § 2716.06 whether the debtor's wages are to be paid to the court prior
to the time that he receives notice of the garnishment or only after the debtor either (1) failed to request
a hearing on the garnishment or (2) the hearing was had and the amount of wages to be garnisheed confirmed,
and an order subsequent to (I) or (2) issued by the court directing the garnishee to pay the garnished wages
into court. Compare ". . . some of your personal earnings, now in the possession of your employer..."
(2716.06(A)) with "The court shall issue an order to the garnishee to pay . . . the wages . .. into court,
if they have not already been paid to the court." (2716.06(C)).
"'The idea of including something similar to a "request for hearing" form with the notice of garnishment
served upon the debtor can be traced to Simler, 23 Ohio Op. 3d at 310 which states ... a simple procedure
for requesting a hearing ...."
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exemption(s). The third is similar to "Request for Hearing" forms mandated
by other sections of H.B. 254.111
The 2716.06 "Request for Hearing" form includes a clause pertaining to
"'emergency" situations in which the debtor can speed up the hearing process
if garnishment of his wages would leave him destitute. The "Request for Hear-
ing" form set out in 2716.06 specifies that a hearing shall be had upon the
debtor's request within twelve days after its receipt by the court; this is a smaller
time frame than is contained in any of the pre-judgment remedies sections of
H.B. 254 within which the debtor must be afforded his post-seizure hearing.I7
Noticeable by its absence in 2716.06, or any other section of Chapter 2716,
is any provision for a court-ordered continuance of the time in which a debtor
can request a post-seizure hearing. If he doesn't make the request within the
stated five days after his receipt of the Notice to Defendant, his right to such
a hearing is apparently completely extinguished " 3 and an order for payment
of the garnisheed funds over to the creditor will issue forthwith from the court. 74
The last sentence of 2716.06(B) defines the parameters within which a
debtor's right to a hearing subsequent to the issuance of the order of garnish-
ment must occur when that right is exercised. By its language, that sentence
explicitly precludes a debtor from coming to the hearing and arguing the merits
of the case. No exceptions to this rule are provided for in either 2716.06 or
elsewhere in Chapter 2716. Whether such a total deprivation of any chance
for a debtor to argue the merits of his case at one of these hearings is sound
law or public policy is debatable:
[The debtor] is deemed to know that certain enforcement proceedings
naturally will follow. The continuing validity of this assumption can be
criticized because of the dubious nature of many judgments awarded
without an actual hearing on the merits ever having taken place, and
because many consumers lack a basic familiarity with the judicial pro-
cess .... Default by a large number of consumer debtors given the oppor-
tunity to appear in court casts serious doubt on the assumption that the
debtor has received a meaningful opportunity to be heard.'75
The inclusion of some form of judicial discretion to hear the merits of the case
at the debtor's post-seizure hearing under certain circumstances could, perhaps,
have been included in the statute to remedy at least those extreme cases of hard-
ship that do occur from time to time.
"'See supra § 2.12.
"'The court must look to a 20 day time frame for both attachment and replevin. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2715.043(A), 2737.07(A).
"'There is no provision made in the garnishment of wages situation for a court-ordered extension of the
time in which the debtor can request such a hearing. This must be compared with other sections of H.B.
254, where such provision is made; see supra, § 2.04; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
"'Oo REV. CODE ANN. § 2716.06(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
1"Alderman, Default Judgments and Postjudgment Remedies Meet the Constitution: Effectuating Sniadach
and its Progeny, 65 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 (1976).
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3.06 Post-Judgment Garnishment of Property Other
Than Wages - RC. § 2716.11-2716.13
The substantive provisions of §§ 2716.11-2716.13 are largely patterned after
the garnishment of personal earnings sections of H.B. 254, with the structure
of some of the attachment and replevin provisions being used for models as
well.' 76 The hybrid nature of this remedy can undoubtedly be attributed to the
fact that while it is a post-judgment garnishment remedy, the property being
subjected to that remedy is the same as that which is the object of the replevin
and attachment remedies - personal property other than wages. For the pur-
poses of this analysis, only those provisions of 2716.11-2716.13 which are suf-
ficiently different from those sections of H.B. 254 upon which the bulk of
2716.11-2716.13 is based will be set out for explication.
The affidavit required as a condition precedent to the issuance of an order
for post-judgment garnishment of property other than personal earnings, set
out in 2716.11, is less detailed than any of its counterparts in H.B. 254. The
contrast with the wage garnishment affidavit is especially revealing; no
preliminary demand is necessary before the 2716.11 affidavit is filed with the
court and the order of garnishment issued by the court according to the provi-
sions of 2716.13. This difference can best be explained by the status wages have
attained in the eyes of judges and lawmakers as a more valued form of pro-
perty that is deserving of a concommitantly greater amount of protection by
the law.' 77
The maximum number of days allowed to elapse between the time an order
of garnishment is issued and the time a debtor shall have the hearing designated
as rightfully his by statute, if timely requested, is identical to the time span
found in the wage garnishment provisions and different from the time alloted
by the attachment and replevin sections of H.B. 254. '7 It should probably be
inferred that the necessity for a quick post-seizure hearing is greater within the
garnishment context because of the greater chance for error. 179
CONCLUSION
In response to United States Supreme Court decisions, the Ohio legislature
has made sweeping changes in Ohio debtor-creditor law. These changes go well
beyond the threshold requirements set down by the Supreme Court; the new
Ohio law should withstand constitutional scrutiny.
'"The affidavit required by 2716.11 is similar in form to the affidavits required in 2715.03 (attachment)
and 2737.03 (replevin). The notice to the defendant required by 2716.13(C)(1)(a) is analogous to the notice
mandated by 2715.041(A). Finally, the "Order and Notice" of 2716.13(B) is like the "Order and Notice"
of 2716.05.
.'See Kripke, supra note 168, in this regard. For people living at or near the poverty level, personal earnings
will constitute their only means of support from one paycheck to the next.
"'See supra note 172.
"'One need only look to the facts surrounding the garnishment of the bank account owned by one of
the plaintiffs in Simler to see the risks inherent in asking a third part to ascertain what property of the
debtor's they have in their possession and to determine if any of it is exempt.
[Vol. 16:3
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss3/5
Winter, 19831 STUDENT PROJECT 515
The Ohio Supreme Court struck down the former replevin statute in Peebles
v. Clement in 1980. Since that time there has been no apparent guideline in
the area of pre- or post-judgment remedies. The primary goal of the legislature
in implementing House Bill 254 was to enact a sound scheme for effectuating
these remedies.
The true effectiveness of the act, however, will not be demonstrated unless
its provisions are actually employed. The major premise underlying the enact-
ment of the statute is that the measure will be widely utilized. Only time and
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